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Abstract
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) has been used for tackling major research ques-
tions in macroeconomics for at least two decades. This growing field positions itself as an
alternative to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In this paper, we pro-
vide a much needed review and synthesis of this literature and recent attempts to incorporate
insights from ACE into DSGE models. We first review the arguments raised against DSGE
in the macroeconomic ACE (macro ACE) literature, and then review existing macro ACE
models, their explanatory power and empirical performance. We then turn to the literature
on behavioural New Keynesian models that attempts to synthesise these two approaches to
macroeconomic modelling by incorporating insights of ACE into DSGE modelling. Finally, we
provide a thorough description of the internally rational New Keynesian model, and discuss
how this promising line of research can progress.
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1 Introduction
Agent based modelling is a computational research method that is frequently used in studies of
complex social phenomena. As the name suggests, simple representations of decision-makers in
social, economic, or political contexts are at the core of this method. By generating a high number
of heterogeneous agents that can respond to internal and local as well as aggregate variables,
researchers can simulate adaptive behaviour, interdependent decision making, spatial patterns and
social networks in a broad range of contexts. In economics, such contexts include, but are not
restricted to, asset price fluctuations (Horst (2005)), price bubbles (Duffy and Unver (2006)),
bankruptcy cascades (Tedeschi et al. (2012)), and systemic risk related to the housing market
(Geanakoplos et al. (2012)). The agent-based literature in economics has been given a number of
names, but it is most commonly referred to as agent-based computational economics (ACE).
In macroeconomics, ACE models have been used for at least two decades, and they have
continued to capture the attention of scholars, central banks, and policy makers since the Great
Recession. An emerging literature attempts to incorporate the insights of macroeconomic ACE
(macro ACE) into conventional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The result
of this literature is the ‘behavioural New Keynesian model’, which follows the work of Branch and
McGough (2010), Branch et al. (2012), Branch and Evans (2011), De Grauwe and Katwasser (2012),
De Grauwe (2011), and others. In this paper, we provide a much needed review and synthesis of
this literature and its antecedents, linking it back to the macro ACE critiques of DSGE modelling.
This synthetic perspective allows us to clarify the arguments and contributions of recent research,
and discuss how the program as a whole can develop to advance macroeconomic modelling. In
particular, we propose that a version of the behavioural New Keynesian model that incorporates
the internal rationality approach of Adam and Marcet (2011) is a fruitful way forward, and we
provide a thorough description of the resulting New Keynesian model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the relevant criticisms
of DSGE modelling from the macro ACE literature. We then critically review key models in the
macro ACE literature in section 3, and examine their empirical performance and explanatory power
in Section 4. This part of the paper clarifies the main arguments and theoretical background of
macro ACE studies for readers who are not yet familiar with this literature, and sheds light
on the avenues by which conventional DSGE models can be improved. Then, in Section 5, we
discuss the extent to which the limitations highlighted in macro ACE studies have been addressed
in the behavioural New Keynesian model. Finally, we present very recent work following Deak
et al. (2016) on the internally rational New Keynesian model, which provides the behavioural New
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Keynesian model with more robust microfoundations.
We hope that this overview and synthesis of the literature on macro ACE and behavioural New
Keynesian economics will be useful for macroeconomists who are not yet familiar with the two
literatures, or the manner in which they are related. We also hope that it will provide signposts
for extending both the macro ACE and DSGE literatures, and provide a possible framework for a
more realistic macroeconomics.
2 ACE Critiques of DSGE
In this section, we review some of the criticisms of DSGE modelling from an ACE perspective.
We do not present a comprehensive review of the criticisms directed at DSGE from macro ACE
scholars. Rather, we present those criticisms that seem most important in achieving a constructive
re-evaluation of the DSGE and macro ACE approaches. An alternative, complementary critique
of DSGE from the ACE perspective can be found in Fagiolo and Roventini (2016). Specifically,
we consider four arguments: that DSGE models ignore heterogeneity, disequilibrium, complex
dynamics, and bounded rationality.
2.1 Representative Agent versus Heterogeneous Interacting Agents
The representative agent (RA) assumption is, arguably, at the core of both DSGE modelling and
criticism towards it. Essentially, it is the idea that a single agent can stand for an entire sector
of the economy, and that any aggregation bias that results from this is negligible. Alongside
a number of epistemological concerns (see Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Delli Gatti et al. (2010)),
macro ACE critics argue that the RA assumption ignores significant heterogeneities in preferences
and endowments, including non-normal distributions and interactions between agents (Delli Gatti
et al. (2005)) and, for this reason, DSGE models do not allow any room for emergent macroscopic
patterns (Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Gaffeo et al. (2007), see also Gabaix (2011) in this respect).
These ACE criticisms of the RA assumption are rather different from the contemporary cri-
tiques of aggregation within the mainstream macroeconomic community, which tend to focus on
approximate aggregation results (see Heathcote et al. (2009) for a survey). Notwithstanding this,
contemporary dynamic general equilibrium modelling has gone a long way in answering critiques
of representative agent assumptions, particularly with the work on incomplete market models
that started in the real business cycle literature (e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and Smith (1998),
Heathcote et al. (2009)). Overlapping generations models also remain important - although more
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in growth theory than short run macroeconomics - and there also exist DSGE models that incor-
porate asset market segmentation and multiple countries (see e.g. Alvarez et al. (2002) for a model
which incorporates both of these elements). Finally, one might also mention DSGE models with
simpler forms of heterogeneity, including the rule-of-thumb consumers introduced in Gali et al.
(2007). This approach retains the benefits of heterogeneous agents whilst significantly reducing
the computational burden of, for example, incomplete market models.
In section 5 of this paper we outline a different approach to heterogeneity which we believe is
closer to the ACE critiques of DSGE than those mentioned above. Finally, however, it is worth
pointing out that macro ACE studies also criticise the RA assumption in terms of the purpose it
serves. Traditionally, following the Lucas critique, one of the major reasons for the popularity of
DSGE models is their ability to deliver robust predictions of the effects of policy shifts. However, in
cases where preferences are influenced by policy regimes (Bowles (1998), Delli Gatti et al. (2010)),
the RA approach may fail to deliver robust predictions given unpredictable changes in behaviour.
2.2 General Equilibrium versus Disequilibrium
As their name suggests, DSGE models rely heavily on equilibrium methods. Whilst the definition
of equilibrium is contested in economic theory (Milgate 1987), at the most basic level it implies
a collapse in the time ordering of events. Thus, for example, the predicted values of endogenous
variables in a DSGE model, within any given time period, are the solution to a system of simul-
taneous equations. Usually the system does not have a unidirectional causal structure within the
period, and no time ordering of events can be unambiguously assigned1. As a result, the stability
of the intra-period equilibrium is usually not an object of study in contemporary macroeconomics,
and instead the stability properties of sequences of temporary equilibria are studied.
The macro ACE literature is critical of the equilibrium assumption in DSGE modelling. These
criticisms, however, tend to focus on the Walrasian equilibria used in the real business cycle
literature and older DSGE models. It is, for example, pointed out that the set of competitive
prices that clear Walrasian market systems is not necessarily unique, with obvious implications
for stability (Gaffeo et al. (2007), Lengnick (2013)). More generally, it is argued that the reliance
on systems of simultaneous equations within time periods leads to a focus, not on ‘real’, but on
‘hypothetical’ time in reference to the taˆtonnement process, and the Walrasian auctioneer. In this
1Consider the system, A(xt) = B(xt−1, xt−2, ...). If A represents a directed acyclic graph (i.e. a graph in which one
cannot loop back to any vertex from itself), then there is a simple unidirectional contemporaneous causal structure
between the variables in x. We could also interpret this as a unidirectional time ordering of events within the period,
and use it as a formal definition of disequilibrium. As far as the authors are aware, all ACE models are of this form;
DSGE models are not often of this form.
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respect, the macro ACE literature argues that by focusing on equilibria that an economy reaches
in hypothetical time, DSGE models fail to tackle mechanisms of coordination and learning that
corresponded to a failure to understand how exactly the economy works (Howitt (2012); also see
Mosini (2007)).
2.3 Exogenous Shocks versus Complex Dynamics
In light of the arguments that DSGE modelling ignores heterogeneity, local interaction, and dise-
quilibrium, macro ACE scholars criticise mainstream macroeconomics for ignoring the complexity
of economic dynamics. Whilst complexity is often only approximately defined, the basic determi-
nants are a high dimensional state space and a degree of non-linearity such that superposition is
not present. Superposition is a property of linear systems, whereby the net response of a system
to two or more simultaneous impulses is given by the sum of the responses of the system to the
same impulses separately. In particular, two identical impulses, differing only in sign, will cancel
each other out. With non-linear models this property fails to hold, and as such the response of a
non-linear system to an impulse is not necessarily proportional to the size of the shock, and the
state of the system will matter in determining the response to any given shock (see also Chen
and Wang (2011); Al-Suwailem (2011)). In addition, some scholars argue that complexity requires
neutral equilibria, such that complex dynamics are a mid-point between chaos and asymptotic
stability (Foley (2005)).
The macro ACE community argues that this type of complexity is pervasive in macroeconomics,
with particular importance being given to endogenous business cycles, or business cycles that
are not driven by aggregate shocks. Dosi et al. (2008), for example, argue that real business
cycle models and New Keynesian DSGE models are both inadequate because a large part of the
dynamics are driven by aggregate technology shocks, and “both streams of literature dramatically
underestimate the role of endogenous technological shocks occurring at the microeconomic level”
(ibid.). Gaffeo et al. (2007), similarly, argue that “complexity arises because of the dispersed,
localized, non-linear interactions of a large number of heterogeneous components”, and that the
economy should be modelled as such.2 This criticism is related to a more basic criticism that
DSGE papers tend to focus on saddle-path stable parameterisations of linearised models.
As with the ACE critique of representative agents outlined in section 2.1, the critique of com-
plexity and non-linearity has been addressed to a certain extent in recent DSGE models. First,
2It should be noted that endogenous business cycles have a history that long pre-dates ACE - Hicks, Kalecki, and
Kaldor were early advocates, and Goodwin (1967) is a classic example. This literature continues in contemporary
Post Keynesian and Marxian economics.
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non-linearity and chaotic dynamics had been incorporated into optimising models in the 1980s (see
Benhabib (1992) for a collection of the early papers), but this approach faded from view during
the ‘Great Moderation’. Second, standard DSGE models are highly non-linear in their structural
form, and it is possible to solve and estimate higher order approximations given modern computing
power. Examples of where this is necessary include any situation in which risk affects decision mak-
ing - e.g. asset pricing or optimal policy problems. A useful discussion in the context of simulated
method of moments is presented in Ruge-Murcia (2012), and work on estimating the non-linear
model presented in section 5 of the present paper (using Bayesian techniques) is ongoing work in
progress.
2.4 Rational Expectations versus Bounded Rationality
The final ACE criticism of the DSGE paradigm that we wish to highlight is concerned with
rational expectations (RE). This criticism is similar to existing critiques of the rational expectations
hypothesis, which extend back to the early days of New Classical economic theory, but arises as an
almost necessary conclusion from the focus on heterogeneity, disequilibrium, and complexity. An
interesting extension of the rational expectations critique from the ACE community is linked to the
concept of “emergence” - since real-life versions of economic agents are clearly not equipped with
perfect information and foresight, rational expectations are not a property of individual agents
but of the system as a whole. In other words, rational expectations supposes that expectations
are correct on average, and economic theory refers to an instance of “emergence” in the RE
hypothesis. This, of course, is contested. For example, Howitt argues that, “even blind faith in
internal rationality does not guarantee that the system as a whole will find this fixed point [of
rational expectations]” (Howitt (2012)).
As before, modern DSGE models often go beyond the rational expectations benchmark. Var-
ious approaches have been proposed in the literature, including least squares learning, rational
inattention, restricted perceptions, and near-rational expectations (see Woodford (2013) for a very
useful survey). As a move away from rational expectations is at the core of the model presented
in section 5, we postpone further discussion of this issue until then - although it is important to
note that alternative approaches exist which dull the impact of the ACE critique.
2.5 Summary
Four important critiques of DSGE from an ACE perspective revolve around heterogeneity, dise-
quilibrium, complexity, and rationality. Modern DSGE models often answer one or more of these
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critiques, and we have mentioned some important examples in the foregoing. Notwithstanding
this, ACE models attempt to move away from DSGE models along all of these lines simultane-
ously. Before the behavioural New Keynesian models that aim to incorporate the insights of ACE
are considered in section 5, the key macroeconomic ACE models are examined in section 3, and
their empirical performance is reviewed in section 4.
3 Key Macro ACE Models
Although it is difficult to strictly classify and compare ACE models, it is possible to identify four
major families of models within the macro ACE literature. These are the Keynes meets Schumpeter
(K&S) model (Dosi et al. (2006), Dosi et al. (2008), Dosi et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013)), the CATS
model3 (Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Delli Gatti et al. (2007), Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Gaffeo et al.
(2007), Russo et al. (2007), Ricetti et al. (2013)), the Eurace model (Deissenberg et al. (2008),
Dawid et al. (2009), Cincotti et al. (2010), Dawid and Neugart (2011), Raberto et al. (2012))
and the Strategy Switching (SS) models following Brock and Hommes (1997). The following
subsections aim to introduce these families of models, explain how they differ from each other in
terms of addressing the abovementioned criticisms of the DSGE approach and give examples of
decision making heuristics that they use to give a general idea about their modelling approach.
3.1 The K&S Model
The K&S family of models has been developed by Dosi, Fagiolo and Rovetini for over a decade.
The first paper that we could identify was published in 2006 (Dosi et al, 2006), although the
first model that the authors called a K&S model is dated 2010 (Dosi et al. (2010)). Across various
versions, two properties of K&S models are useful when comparing them with other macroeconomic
models. Firstly, from a theoretical standpoint, the authors position their models in evolutionary
perspectives (Nelson and Winter (1982)) and as the name K&S implies, they refer to influential
paradigms in the history of economic thought aiming to develop a synthetic perspective of issues
that are usually studied separately. The model is used to study Keynesian approaches to demand
dynamics together with Schumpeterian approaches to innovation (Dosi et al. (2010)), and in later
versions (Dosi et al. (2013)), Minskyan credit dynamics are also added to the analysis. Secondly, in
3Also referred to as the MBU model in Delli Gatti et al. (2011). MBU stands for “Macroeconomics from the
Bottom Up”, whereas CATS stands for “Complex AdapTive System” - and is a play on the names of two of the
model’s chief authors, apparently suggested by Hyman Minsky.
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terms of the model conceptualisation, K&S models are critical of exogenous technological shocks in
mainstream DSGE models and represent technological progress as endogenous to macroeconomic
dynamics. Endogeneity of technological progress is implemented in K&S models with a detailed
capital goods industry that produces machinery and equipment for the consumer goods industry,
invests in research and innovation and thus populates the economy with different vintages of capital
goods. In this respect, K&S models also differ from most other macro ACE models that do not
represent innovation explicitly.
As is common in agent-based models, agents are heterogenous in K&S models and their be-
haviour is boundedly rational. Whilst households consume all of their income (an extreme form
of the Keynesian consumption heuristic), firms price and produce in an approximately Post Key-
nesian manner. For example, production levels are determined by naive or adaptive expectations
over demand levels, and pricing is given by a mark-up over unit costs, where the mark-up evolves
according to the following heuristic:
µjt = µjt−1
(
1 +
fjt−1 − fjt−2
fjt−2
)
. (1)
In (1), µj denotes firm j’s mark-up, whilst fj denotes firm j’s market share. Whilst this heuristic
could be interpreted as pursuing profit maximisation, there is no attempt in the Dosi et al papers
to formally justify this. Given the above, the K&S model produces macroeconomic complexity in
the sense of endogenous business cycles, which appear to be driven by pervasive non-linearity and
idiosyncratic shocks.
3.2 The CATS Model
The CATS family of macro ACE models has also been developed over a long period of time, with
publications dating back to early 2000s. Although these publications jointly have a long list of
authors, two names in Domenico Delli Gatti and Mauro Gallegati appear to be at the core of the
development of CATS models. Like the K&S models, CATS models incorporate heterogeneity and
boundedly rational agents. Unlike K&S models that are positioned in evolutionary economics,
however, CATS models make frequent references to complexity theory and methodological devel-
opments in statistical physics (see for example, Bianchi et al. (2008), Delli Gatti et al. (2010)).
While K&S models emphasise endogeneity of technological progress, CATS models focus on emer-
gent macroeconomic outcomes, in particular, the role of firm heterogeneity in the transmission and
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amplification of shocks, and position the concept of emergence as an alternative to equilibrium
theorising.
In terms of the model structures, CATS models are simpler than K&S models in terms of
agent types, and more complex in terms of direct interaction. Many CATS models (for example
Delli Gatti et al. (2003), Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Russo et al. (2007)) have one production sec-
tor that interacts with a banking sector, although some (for example Delli Gatti et al. (2009),
Delli Gatti et al. (2010)) also incorporate an intermediate goods sector.
In Russo et al. (2007) the economy consists of one sector with idiosyncratic R&D shocks at
the firm level. Again, firms’ pricing strategies are boundedly rational, and evolve according to the
following heuristic:
P sjt =
 Pjt−1(1 + ηjt) if Sjt−1 = 0Pjt−1(1− ηjt) if Sjt−1 > 0 (2)
In (2), Sj denotes the firm’s stock of unsold goods, and ηj is a firm specific idiosyncratic shock.
Hence the firm raises its price if it sells all its produced output in the previous period, and lowers
it otherwise. This is not associated with profit maximisation, but is associated with Simon’s
“satisficing” approach to firm behaviour (P sj denotes the firm’s “satisfying” price; this is equal
to the selling price if it covers unit cost). As with the K&S models, the CATS models produce
macroeconomic complexity in the sense of endogenous business cycles driven by idiosyncratic shocks
and pervasive non-linearity.
3.3 The Eurace Model
The Eurace model was produced by a project that attempted to construct an agent-based model of
the European economy, by representing four markets (consumer goods, investment goods, labour,
and financial markets), incorporating spatial elements (the NUTS-2 regions of the EU-27 countries)
and generating an unusually large number of agents (Deissenberg et al. (2008)). In this larger
model, the heuristic behaviour of at least some of the agents is brought closer to internal rationality
- that is, explicit utility and/or profit maximisation in the context of bounded rationality. In
particular, the pricing decision of consumption goods firms is predicated on the belief in a CES
demand function. Denoting the expected price elasticity as εe, firms set prices in the Eurace model
as follows:
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pjt =
c¯jt−1
1 + 1/εejt
(3)
In (3), c¯jt−1 is a measure of unit costs that takes into account past costs and inventory levels.
Household behaviour is also based on internal rationality, where the decision rule is justified by
appeal to prospect theory, and in particular the theory of loss aversion.
3.4 Strategy Switching Models
The SS models follow the general approach of Brock and Hommes (1997) in representing different
strategies agents use to form their expectations. These models usually distinguish between agents
who use sophisticated but costly strategies and those who use simple, less costly heuristics. The
former are usually thought of as agents who think in line with and are capable of applying main-
stream economic theory. Fundamentalists, for example, expect asset prices to reflect an unbiased
reflection of news about future income streams related to the asset (see, for example, Lux and
Marchesi (1999)). The latter are often thought of as noise traders, agents with naive expectations,
or chartists. Yet, they have the capability of switching to the more sophisticated strategy. In effect,
the core dynamics of the model are shaped around agents switching between the two (or more)
strategies based on fitness measures and costs of strategies. In addition to showing the emergent
properties resulting from interdependencies between agents’ strategies, or the “rational route to
randomness”, strategy switching is used in macro ACE models for incorporating learning, usually
in the context of learning based on fitness measures or by observing performances of other agents.
The macro ACE models that use strategy switching usually focus on macroeconomic dynamics
related to financial markets. While the other modelling families discussed in this section mainly
developed around the work of a core group of authors, the progress of SS models has been dis-
tributed with authors independent from each other developing their versions of strategy switching
and apply it to a broad range of contexts.
3.5 Summary
The overview of some of the key elements of the K&S, CATS, Eurace, and SS models provided
above can only scratch the surface of what are vibrant and continuing research programs. Later
versions of the K&S and CATS models, for example, incorporate credit and banking networks, and
examine the role of government policy in controlling fluctuations and growth. Nevertheless, we
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hope to have given an indication of the manner in which existing macro ACE models incorporate
heterogeneity, disequilibrium, complexity, and bounded rationality.
4 Explanatory Power and Empirical Performance of Macro ACE
Models
This section reviews the explanatory power and empirical performance of the models examined
in section 3. Macro ACE models investigate various dynamics and contexts and it is not possible
to fully describe the contribution of the literature here. Our aim instead is to provide some
insights about how these models can be used to explain macroeconomic phenomena, and to provide
examples of how the main modelling families we identified in the previous section have been
empirically validated. As above, we consider the four most prominent families of macro ACE
models sequentially: the Dosi et al K&S model, the Delli Gatti et al CATS model, the Eurace
model, and the SS model.
In addition, we examine two more recent models: the Lengnick (2013) model, and the Assenza
et al. (2015) model. Each of these models, to varying degrees, is subject to a calibration and
moment comparison exercise in at least one published paper.
4.1 The K&S Model
The early K&S models (see, for example, Dosi et al. (2006)) focused on studying business cycles
together with several stylised facts concerning the distributions of macroeconomic variables, and
showed that interactions between boundedly rational firms in an environment characterised by
endogenous technological shocks and demand waves can create cyclical patterns. Later versions of
the model (Dosi et al. (2010)) demonstrated the complemantarity between Schumpeterian innova-
tion and Keynesian demand-management policies for achieving sustained growth. In this respect,
the models suggest that even though Schumpeterian policies create beneficial structural change,
they alone are not adequate to foster long term growth. In a more recent (Dosi et al. (2013))
version of the model with Minskyan credit dynamics, the authors investigate the interactions be-
tween distribution of income (between wages and profits) and monetary and fiscal policies in terms
of their effects on output and employment. The simulation results indicate that the effects of
monetary policy depend on the functional income distribution, as the higher the distribution is
skewed towards profits, the less the need of firms for external finance and so the smaller the effect
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of monetary policy. Regarding fiscal policies, like in the 2010 paper, authors conclude fiscal policy
is necessary to control business cycles.
Out of the papers studying the K&S model, Dosi et al. (2008) provides the most in depth
empirical validation. Dosi et al. (2008) initially identifies a number of stylised facts to facilitate
basic qualitative validation of the model. These include the standard US business cycle facts, the
lumpiness and finance dependent nature of individual firm investment expenditure, pronounced
and persistent productivity dispersion across firms, and the distinctive distributions of firm size
and firm growth rates. The basic calibration follows the antecedent models in Dosi et al. (2005)
and Dosi et al. (2006), but is otherwise unexplained. Nevertheless, the model reproduces the
basic stylised facts that the authors target, and this result appears to be robust to the exact
parameterisation used (see Dosi et al. (2006)).
Of greater interest are the cross-correlograms presented. These compare the correlations at
plus and minus four lags of band pass filtered consumption and GDP, investment and GDP, stock
accumulation and GDP, employment and GDP, and unemployment and GDP. Interestingly, given
the detailed modelling of firm level investment in the model, and the ability of the model to match
cross-sectional stylised facts, aggregate investment still performs poorly in comparison to the other
time series. This is in line with the failure of standard New Keynesian DSGE models to match
aggregate investment data satisfactorily.
4.2 The CATS Model
Early CATS models focus on the emergent macroeconomic outcomes of heterogeneity of agents.
In this respect, while the K&S models focus on heterogeneity in terms of subclasses of agents (con-
sumer and capital good) and accumulated capital stocks (levels and mix of different technologies),
CATS models tend to focus on behavioural heterogeneity, such as the distribution of variables re-
lated to the financial structure of firms. In a 2003 version of the model (Delli Gatti et al. (2003)),
the focus is on entry and exit dynamics and how they affect the financial fragility of the system
as a whole by changing the distribution of firms with respect to their equity ratio, which affects
their ability to use credit. By not assuming exiting firms will be replaced by new firms with similar
properties, the model allows the generation of procyclical behaviour of entries and exits, which then
contributes to the formation of business cycles in a Minskyan manner. The 2005 paper builds on
this approach of allowing for endogenous exit dynamics, this time focusing on firm size which tends
to have a power law distribution, and presents a possibility proof for the existence of a Laplace
distribution of growth rates of firm-level and aggregate output. In a 2010 (Delli Gatti et al. (2010))
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paper, however, the authors employ a different approach. Unlike the previous papers mentioned
above, they focus on the endogenous evolution of credit networks between banks, upstream, and
downstream firms. The network evolves through preferential attachment while agents search for
better prices or interest rates in limited random subsets of potential counterparts and the paper
shows that these interactions can create bankruptcy avalanches.
Out of the papers studying the CATS model family, Gaffeo et al. (2008) provides the most in
depth empirical validation. This paper is particularly interesting, from our perspective, in that it
explicitly attempts to “rival the explanatory power of DSGE models” (ibid.: 443). As with Dosi
et al. (2008), the calibration is unexplained. However, instead of a list of stylised facts, the authors
regard endogenous business cycles as a basic explandum, and compare the model’s time series co-
movements with US data. Unfortunately the correlograms presented are mostly not comparable
with those of Dosi et al. (2008), describing the correlations at plus and minus four lags of Hodrick-
Prescott filtered employment and GDP, productivity and GDP, price index and GDP, interest rate
and GDP, and the real wage and GDP. Neither is there an attempt to compare these correlations
with a standard New Keynesian DSGE model - although on balance, it seems fair to say that the
model performs relatively poorly compared to Dosi et al. (2008).
4.3 The Eurace Model
Due to its large scale and detailed nature, published studies using the Eurace model tend to focus
on part of the model with only some of the markets being activated and the foci of these studies
have been on specific policy instruments. There appears to be two main streams of studies in this
regard; one (led by Dawid) studies labour market dynamics and skills within the main structure of
the Eurace model and the other (by Cincotti, Raberto and Teglio) studies dynamics in the financial
and credit markets. Regarding the first stream, a 2008 paper (Dawid et al. (2008)) puts together
a stochastic process for technological progress of capital goods, spatial elements in terms of two
regions with different average skill levels and commuting costs, policy options of investing heavily
in one region versus more equally in both regions and the dynamics related to consumer goods
and labour markets with respect to diverging costs and prices between regions due to differences
in productivity. The study found that although investing heavily in improving skills in one region
yields higher output in the short run, this policy performs worse in the long run due to labour
shortage in the well performing region. In their 2009 paper, the authors showed that the effect
of commuting costs on the above mentioned cost, price and output dynamics are not monotonic.
Although in both no and high commuting cost scenarios investing heavily in one region yields
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worse results in terms of output growth, in the case of low commuting costs it performs better
than investing equally in both regions. The 2014 study used a social network context instead of a
spatial distribution and studied the impact of the density of workers’ networks on wage inequality
in the context of referral hiring. The model in this study allows for a gap between productivity
of firms to emerge endogenously as firms decide on which capital goods to invest in based on the
average skill level of their workers. The wage firms offer reflect this productivity gap, and firms
with higher productivity offer higher wages. In this context, although firms do not discriminate
between referral and non-referral hirings, wage inequality emerges between workers who obtain
their jobs through referrals and those who obtain their jobs via other avenues.
Like CATS and K&S models, the second stream of Eurace papers focused on understanding
business cycles, in particular through the interplay between real economic variables such as output
and employment and the structure and dynamics of the credit market. A 2010 paper (Cincotti
et al. (2010) see also Raberto et al. (2012) and Teglio et al. (2012)), for example, represents the
interdependencies between financial and credit markets through firms’ dividend payment decisions.
These affect the demand for credit, and the quantitative easing policy of government affects the
supply of money, and the authors show how these dynamics can produce endogenous business
cycles.
Unsurprisingly, the Eurace model, given its size, is also not subject to formal estimation. Given
this, the Eurace model builders approach the calibration problem in the same manner as early
versions of the K&S and CATS models - a set of stylised facts is identified, and the region of the
parameter space that can reproduce those facts is identified. In general, as before, this seems to be
a relatively informal method, but Dawid et al. (2009) cite a number of varied empirical studies to
justify the choice of calibration. It is difficult, from the available literature, to judge the empirical
performance of the calibrated Eurace model.
4.4 The Strategy Switching Models
SS models are used mostly for exploring the results of interdependencies between agents’ strategies.
Lux and Marchesi’s (1999) study, for example, indicates a critical value for the number of noise
traders a market can accommodate before starting to show high volatility. This volatile phase
of the market, however, is temporary as it creates perceived opportunities for fundamentalists
whose actions re-stabilise markets. Similarly, in Landini et al. (2015) the SS approach is placed
in a simple macro ACE model with households, consumer good firms and a representative bank.
Firms in the model need to choose a value for a financial coefficient which affects their output
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level. They can learn which strategy performs better with or without interaction. Like Lux and
Marchesi (1999), the paper shows that phase transitions in the economy depend on the number
of agents using each strategy, and indicates the critical rate of strategy switching that generates
further phase transitions. The authors call these recursive dynamics re-configurative learning. In
Salle et al (2013) there is a similar interaction, but this time it is households who learn from each
other while they are trying to adjust their reservation wage and consumption patterns based on
expectations of inflation. The model also has a central bank that applies inflation targeting and
the study focuses on the role of precision and credibility of the central bank’s inflation target in a
learning economy. The results of the study indicate that perceived noise surrounding the central
bank’s choice of inflation target may lead to co-ordination failures between households and the
central bank, resulting in a trade-off between unemployment and the inflation target.
Although most SS models are theoretical, simplified versions of the Brock and Hommes 1998
model have been used as examples in papers on validation of ACE models (Recchioni et al. (2015);
Kukacka and Barunik (2016)). Notably, the type of learning interaction modelled in SS models has
been extensively studied in laboratory experiments, where the explanatory power of these models
can be rigorously tested. This is not unique in agent based modelling, but it is relatively unusual
in models that pertain to macroeconomic dynamics. See, for example, Hommes (2011). This type
of empirical work is of obvious importance to agent based modelling as a research programme,
given the critique of rational expectations discussed above.
4.5 Recent Models
There exist two prominent macro ACE models that attempt to combine the insights of the K&S
and CATS frameworks into simplified, more manageable models. The aim of Lengnick (2013), the
first of these, is to “take the most prominent ACE macro models and reduce them in complexity”
(pp.104). Again, the calibration is unexplained, but the model succeeds in generating artificial
Phillips curves, Beveridge curves, and the long run neutrality and short run non-neutrality of
money. The only cross-correlogram presented is between the price level and GDP, and the model
appears to perform as least as well as Gaffeo et al. (2008) along this dimension.
The second attempt to combine the K&S and CATS frameworks is presented in Assenza et al.
(2015) - in this case, by including capital goods in a zero growth CATS framework. Again, the
calibration is relatively arbitrary, although a small number of the parameter choices are explained
(e.g. the desired level of capacity utilisation is chosen to match average capacity utilisation in
the USA). However, this paper presents by far the most in depth moment comparison exercise,
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comparing autocorrelation functions and cross-correlograms of HP filtered GDP, consumption,
investment, and unemployment, against equivalent US time series, as well as absolute standard
deviations. The model performs strikingly well along these dimensions. Again, however, it is
interesting to note that investment still performs poorly, in a similar manner to DSGE models -
it is considerably more volatile than in the data. Interestingly, the model correlogram between
unemployment and total debt is qualitatively similar to that in US data, although there appears
to be a small phase shift, and the model correlations are lower at each lag than in the data.
4.6 Summary
Two major conclusions stand out from sections 3 and 4: first, that macro ACE models are very rich,
if rather varied, and second, that their complexity and analytical intractability make them very
difficult to validate empirically. This goes some way in explaining the absence of formal estimation
procedures in the vast majority of macroeconomics ACE papers.4 However, the available evidence
- particularly that presented in Assenza et al. (2015), suggests that ACE is a promising modelling
approach in macroeconomics. Given the relative ease of estimating and validating DSGE models,
and given the significant amount of expertise in DSGE modelling and estimation in the profession
as a whole, this suggests that a fruitful way forward might be the incorporation of ACE insights
into DSGE modelling. This has been attempted in the behavioural New Keynesian model, which
we turn to next.
5 Bridging the Gap
Section 2 of this paper isolated what we believe to be the four most important criticisms of DSGE
modelling from the ACE community. To recap, these are:
• The representative agent assumption, as opposed to heterogeneous interacting agents.
• The general equilibrium assumption, as opposed to disequilibrium and temporal structure.
• Dynamics driven by exogenous shocks, as opposed to complexity and endogenous cycles.
• Rational expectations, as opposed to bounded rationality.
4See Grazzini and Richiardi (2015) for a discussion of the prospects for formal estimation of agent based models.
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This section reviews studies within the DSGE framework that aim to incorporate the insights of
ACE models discussed in section 2. In particular, we review those studies that incorporate the
Brock-Hommes complexity framework into DSGE models, and in so doing respond to three of
the four critiques of DSGE identified here. They do not, however, properly address the issue of
disequilibrium, which is an issue we return to in section 5.5.
In the sense that the models reviewed in this section have features that characterize ACE, they
bridge the gap between the two modelling approaches. In section 5.1 we review the Brock and
Hommes complexity approach, and in section 5.2 the behavioural New Keynesian model. In section
5.3 we review Adam and Marcet’s approach to internal rationality, and explain how this can be
incorporated into the behavioural New Keynesian model to improve the microfoundations of the
latter. Section 5.4 discusses the theoretical and numerical properties of the internally rational New
Keynesian model, following Deak et al. (2016).
5.1 Brock-Hommes Complexity
The complexity framework comprehensively described in Hommes (2013), and first introduced in
Brock and Hommes (1997), provides a minimal way of generating complex dynamics via heteroge-
neous agents with varying degrees of rationality. As such it provides a simple method of answering
the major critiques of DSGE outlined above, but until recently was only explored in the context
of partial equilibrium models and the agent based models considered in sections 3.4 and 4.4. A
simple cob-web model demonstrates the main features. The model is of a partial equilibrium with
two types of producers. A proportion n1,t form rational expectations of the price level pt at time t,
denoted by Et(pt). This amounts to perfect foresight so Et(pt) = pt. The remaining proportion of
producers, 1− n1,t, are boundedly rational in a manner to be defined. Their expectations, formed
at time t−1, are denoted by E∗t−1(pt). We assume linear demand and supply curves subject to ran-
dom shocks d,t and s,t respectively. Given n1,t and our definition of E∗t−1(·), the market-clearing
price is given by:
D(pt) = a− dpt + d,t (4)
S(pt,E∗t−1(pt), n1,t) = s(n1,tpt + (1− n1,t)E∗t−1(pt)) + s,t (5)
D(pt) = S(pt,E∗t−1(pt), n1,t) (6)
where a, d and s are fixed parameters. These pin down the deterministic steady state of the price
level denoted by p. We assume that boundedly rational agents eventually forecast correctly, so
that in the steady state pt = E∗t−1(pt) = p which is given by p = ad+s .
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The learning literature adopts two basic approaches to modelling boundedly rational expecta-
tions. The first is usually referred to as statistical learning, where agents are competent econome-
tricians who make observations of the price (in this example), have some idea of the data generating
process and estimate it using standard techniques. We leave a discussion of this approach to our
later application to a macroeconomic model. Here we adopt the second approach, which assumes
that agents use simple heuristic forecasting rules.5 A general formulation that nests particular
examples found in the literature is an adaptive expectations rule of the form
E∗t−1(pt) = E∗t−2(pt−1) + λ(pt−1 − E∗t−2(pt−1) ; λ ∈ [0, 1] (7)
The key component of the Brock-Hommes framework giving rise to complex dynamics is the
method by which the proportions of rational and non-rational producers are updated over time.
Here the literature adopts a basic general framework set out in Young (2004). To limit the departure
from rationality, the approach of reinforcement learning proposes that, although adaptation can be
slow and there can be a random component of choice, the higher the ‘payoff’ (defined appropriately)
from taking an action in the past, the more likely it will be taken in the future. Here the payoff
is defined as minus the last period’s squared forecasting error plus the cost of obtaining that
forecasting rule. Then the updated fraction of rational producers is given by a discrete logit
model:
n1,t =
exp(−γ[(pt − Et(pt))2 + C])
exp(−γ([pt − Et(pt))2 + C]) + exp(−γ([pt − E∗t−1(pt)]2)
=
exp(−γC)
exp(−γC) + exp(−γ([pt − E∗t−1(pt)]2)
(8)
The key features of (8) is that the best-performing rule will attract the most followers, and that
there is a fixed per period cost, C, of making rational predictions. The parameter γ is referred to
in the literature as the intensity of choice and dictates how quickly agents will switch to the best-
performing rule. The steady state proportion of rational producers is given by n1 =
exp(−γC)
exp(−γC)+1 .
The stability properties of this model depend on the parameter values s, d, a, C that determine
the steady state and λ, γ that determine the speed of learning. For a high proportion of rational
producers the model exhibits local stability: in response to an exogenous shock price and output
return to their steady state values. As C increases above zero the proportion of rational producers
falls and we enter regions of local instability. However, depending on λ and γ, the trajectories are
locally unstable, but do not explode. Rather they show chaotic patterns: random-like complex be-
5Such rules are misspecified and do not converge to a RE equilibrium. Hommes and Zhu (2014) study more
general parsimonious rules of this type.
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haviour. As forecast errors under adaptive expectations become large, non-rational but intelligent
producers switch behaviour by investing the amount C needed to make rational forecasts. Then
forecast errors fall and they switch back to non-rational forecasting.
5.2 The Behavioural New Keynesian Model
The Brock-Hommes framework has been used by a number of authors to propose a behavioural
version of the standard New Keynesian (NK) model with RE (see e.g. Woodford (2003), Gali
(2008)). These include Branch and McGough (2010), Branch et al. (2012), Branch and Evans
(2011), De Grauwe and Katwasser (2012), De Grauwe (2011), De Grauwe (2012a), De Grauwe
(2012b), Jang and Sacht (2012), Massaro (2013) and Jang and Sacht (2014). Branch and McGough
(2016) provides a recent survey. The basic three-equation linearized work-horse NK model used in
this literature in its rational expectations form is as follows:
yt = Etyt+1 − (rt − Etpit+1) + u1,t (9)
pit = βEt[pit+1] + λ(yt + u2,t) (10)
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)(θpipit + θyyt) + u3,t (11)
where yt, pit and rt are the output gap, the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate respectively.
The shock processes ui,t , i = 1, 3 should be interpreted as shocks to preferences, marginal costs and
monetary policy, respectively, and are usually AR(1) processes. (9) is the linearized Euler equation
for consumption which is equated with output in equilibrium (there is no government expenditure).
(10) is the NK Phillips curve and (11) is the nominal interest rate rule with persistence responding
to current inflation and the output gap. Expectations up to now are formed assuming rational
expectations and perfect information of the state vector (which includes the shock processes).6
As in the cob-web model example, the model becomes behavioural by a departure from RE
and the introduction of two groups of agents forming expectations through different learning rules.
In De Grauwe (2012b) there are two groups using fundamentalist (f) and extrapolative (e) rules
with (possibly) non-RE market expectations denoted by E∗. The market forecasts are assumed to
be simple weighted averages:
E∗t yt+1 = αf,tE∗t y
f
t+1 + (1− αf,t)E∗t yet+1 (12)
E∗tpit+1 = βf,tE∗tpi
f
t+1 + (1− βf,t)E∗tpiet+1 (13)
6Habit in consumption and price indexing result in additional lags in yt in (9) and in pit in (10) providing additional
persistence mechanisms that help to fit the model to data.
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We refer to this approach to non-rational expectations as the Euler Learning (EL) approach. The
model is completed by the expressions for the weights αf,t, βf,t, and the learning rules for the
output gap and inflation. The former follows the Brock-Hommes framework as follows:
αf,t =
exp(γUf,t({yt})
exp(γUf,t({yt})) + exp(γUe,t({yt})) (14)
βf,t =
exp(γUf,t({pit}))
exp(γUf,t({pi}t)) + exp(γUe,t({pi}t)) (15)
where Uf,t({xt)}) is the payoff measure of the fundamentalist rule for outcome {xt} = {yt}, {pit},
given by a MSE predictor:
Uf,t({xt})) = ρUf,t−1({xt}))− (1− ρ)[xt−1 − Ef,t−2 xt−1]2 (16)
Equations (9)-(11), with E replaced with E∗, and equations (12)-(16) complete the behavioural
New Keynesian model without specifying the forecasting rules. Whilst De Grauwe, for example,
uses a selection of boundedly rational predictors, rules in the spirit of Brock and Hommes (1997),
Hommes (2013), and Branch and McGough (2010) are
E∗t y
f
t+1 = Etyt+1 (17)
E∗t yet+1 = E∗t−1yet + λy(yt − E∗t−1yet ) ; λy ∈ [0, 1] (18)
E∗tpi
f
t+1 = Etpit+1 (19)
E∗tpiet+1 = E∗t−1piet + λpi(pit − E∗t−1piet ) ; λpi ∈ [0, 1] (20)
This assumes fundamentalists are rational and the extrapolative learners use a general adaptive
expectations rule. As before, we have:
αf,t =
exp(γ(Uf,t({yt})− C))
exp(γ(Uf,t({yt})− C)) + exp(γUe,t({yt})) (21)
βf,t =
exp((γUf,t({pit})− C))
exp((γUf,t({pi}t)− C)) + exp(γUe,t({pi}t)) (22)
where C represents the relative costs of being rational. Thus, by incorporating the Brock-Hommes
complexity framework into the workhorse New Keynesian DSGE model, the behavioural New
Keynesian model incorporates heterogeneity and bounded rationality into a DSGE framework. In
addition, and as with the simple Cobweb model presented in section 5.1, the behavioural NK model
can generate persistent and asymmetric fluctuations in response to small shocks, and generate
endogenous business cycles characterised by bounded instability and chaos (see e.g. Branch et al.
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(2012)). Hence the behavioural NK model answers - at least to some extent - three out of the four
critiques of DSGE modelling outlined above.
5.3 Internal Rationality versus Euler Learning
As Graham (2011) has pointed out, the form of learning implied by the NK behavioural model
above follows the ‘Euler equation learning’ approach (henceforth EL) and in effect assumes that
agents forecast their own decisions - for the household their consumption decision, and for the firm
their price decision. These beliefs only become heuristic forecasts E∗t yt+1 and E∗tpit+1 of aggregate
output and inflation respectively, as implied by the behavioural model of the preceding sub-section,
if we limit the bounded nature of rationality by assuming that, in the symmetric equilibrium,
agents know they are identical.7 This is also true when forecasting rules are well-specified and
can potentially converge to the RE equilibrium in the statistical learning approach pioneered in
Evans and Honkapohja (2001a). Agents then know the minimum state variable (MSV) form of the
equilibrium (equivalent to the saddle-path under rational expectations) and use direct observations
of these states to update their parameter estimates each period using a discounted least-squares
estimator. Then a statistical learning equilibrium is one where this perceived law of motion and
the actual law of motion coincide.
An alternative approach, following Adam and Marcet (2011), was first introduced by Eusepi
and Preston (2011) into an RBC model.8 This assumes that agents are internally rational (IR)
given their beliefs over aggregate states and prices. As with the Euler equation learning approach,
agents cannot form model-consistent expectations and instead learn about these variables using
their knowledge of the MSV form of the equilibrium forming well-specified rules that lead to a
statistical learning equilibrium.
The internal rationality-anticipated utility (henceforth IR) approach in NK behavioural models
with heuristic forecasting rules has been used by Massaro (2013) and Deak et al. (2016), and here
we follow the latter where full details can be found.9 In the rest of this subsection we first describe
the construction of a pure IR equilibrium. Then we demonstrate that the modelling decision of EL
7See Deak et al. (2016) for further discussion of this point.
8A recent survey is provided in Eusepi and Preston (2016). Note they use the term ‘anticipated utility’ instead
if internal rationality and provide a useful discussion of how this modelling assumption differs from Euler equation
learning. We adopt the general definition of internal rationality used by Adam and Marcet (2011): namely that
“agents maximize utility under uncertainty, given their constraints and given a consistent set of probability beliefs
about payoff-relevant variables that are beyond their control or external”. Then beliefs can take the form of a well-
defined probability measure over a stochastic process (the ‘fully Bayesian’ plan), or they can adopt an ‘anticipated
utility framework of Kreps (1998). Adam and Marcet (2011) adopt the former approach whereas this paper and the
other applications mentioned adopt the latter. Cogley and Sargent (2008) compares the two and encouragingly find
that anticipated utility can be seen as a good approximation to fully Bayesian optimization.
9See also the appendix in the working paper version of this paper, Dilaver et al. (2016).
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versus IR matters for monetary policy by examining the policy space for Taylor-rule parameters in
(11) in the two cases. Finally we study the dynamic properties of the heterogeneous RE-IR model
through simulations.
The construction of an IR equilibrium for an NK model goes through the following steps:
• Solve the household budget constraint forward in time and impose the transversality condi-
tion.
• Use the first-order conditions and either linearize or assume point expectations to obtain
consumption as a function of expected nominal interest rates, inflation, wages, tax rates and
profits.
• For monopolistically competitive retail firms express the Calvo contract for the price opti-
mizing firm as a function of expected aggregate demand, aggregate inflation, real marginal
cost and mark-up shocks (again either linearizing or assuming point expectations).
• To close the IR model, we need to specify the manner in which internally rational households
and firms form their expectations.
In modelling the beliefs of IR agents, we assume that variables which are local to the agents, in a
geographical sense, are observable within the period, whereas variables that are strictly macroeco-
nomic are only observable with a lag. This categorization regarding information about the current
state of the economy follows Nimark (2014). He distinguishes between the local information that
agents acquire directly through their interactions in markets and statistics that are collected and
summarised, usually by governments, and made available to the wider public.10 The only excep-
tion to this is the nominal interest rate, which we assume is observable within the period given the
timing structure of New Keynesian models. There are three exogenous autoregressive processes
which drive the uncertainty in the model as a whole. One of these is government spending which is
assumed, via a balanced government budget constraint, to be equal to taxes. Households observe
this per head as a local variable without a lag, but do not know the stochastic process. There are
also technology and mark-up shocks which are unobserved. Given these information assumptions,
we assume a general adaptive expectations rule with one-step ahead forecasts given by:
E∗txt+1 = E∗t−1xt + λx(xt−j − E∗t−1xt) ; j = 0, 1 (23)
where the lag j = 0 applies to local variables and j = 1 applies to macroeconomic variables. In-
ternally rational households then make intertemporal decisions for their consumption demand and
10His paper actually focuses on a third category, information provided by the news media, and allows for imperfect
information in the form of noisy signals, issues which go beyond the scope of our paper.
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hours supply given adaptive expectations of the wage rate, taxation rate, the nominal interest rate
and profits observed with no lag (j = 0), as these are all local variables, and of aggregate inflation
observed with a lag (j = 1). Similarly, IR price-setting retail firms form adaptive expectations of
the local real marginal costs observed with no lag, and of aggregate demand and aggregate infla-
tion observed with a lag. For example, for households the forecast of the future nominal interest
is given by (23) with x = r so that
E∗t rt+1 = E∗t−1rt + λr(rt−j − E∗t−1rt) =
∞∑
i=1
λirrt−j−i ; j = 0, 1 (24)
Finally, the model is closed in the same way as the behavioural NK model considered above,
with two groups of households and firms, one adopting rational expectations and one internally
rational. The proportions of rational households and firms are given by
nh,t =
exp(γΦREh,t )
exp(γΦh,t)RE + exp(γΦ
IR
h,t)
nf,t =
exp(γΦREf,t )
exp(γΦREf,t ) + exp(γΦ
IR
f,t )
where fitness for households is given by
ΦREh,t = µ
RE
h Φ
RE
h,t−1 −
(
weighted sum of forecast errors + Ch
)
ΦIRh,t = µ
IR
h Φ
IR
h,t−1 −
(
weighted sum of forecast errors
)
As before, Ch is a fixed cost of the rational expectations operator for households and firms.
We now have three possible models of expectations, rational (i.e. model consistent), boundedly
rational with Euler learning and boundedly but internally rational. We denote these three cases
by RE, EL and IR respectively. In the next subsection we first consider homogeneous expectations
for which all agents (households and firms) form either RE or IR or EL expectations. We then
allow for the possibility that households and firms are heterogenous across these groups (but retain
intra-group homogeneity). Then we allow for intra-group heterogeneity in a full Brock-Hommes
NK model with IR and RE agents.
5.3.1 Stability Analysis
In the numerical results below we fix parameters at their priors used in the Bayesian estimation
reported in Deak et al. (2016) apart from the adaptive learning parameter λx which we set at unity.
As stated above we make the following information assumptions: for observations of aggregate
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Figure 1: Comparison of Stability Properties of RE and EL Models. ρr > 0, λx = 1.
output and inflation j = 1, which is assumed in the EL approach. Later in the IR approach we
need to model observations of local variables consisting of factor prices, profits and marginal costs.
These we assume to be observed without a lag and therefore j = 0. Note that this only applies to
the EL and IR agents; the RE equilibrium assumes perfect information where agents observe all
current values of the state variables.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the models in (ρr, θpi) space with θy = 0.3. Figure 3 sets ρr = 1
and compares EL and IR models in (αy, αpi) space having re-parameterized the rule as rn,t =
ρrrn,t−1 + αpipit + αyyt. Note that this rule reduces to a price-level rule when αy = 0. The
differences in the sizes of the policy spaces that result in a saddle-path stable equilibrium are
significant. Furthermore a clear ranking of the sizes of these spaces emerges with RE ⊃ EL ⊃ IR.
This means that unless the policy rule is designed for the IR model, uncertainty as to which model
of expectations is correct can lead to a rule that is unstable or has infinitely many equilibria (i.e.
is indeterminate).
Note here that determinacy refers to a locally stable model in which a unique rational expec-
tations consumption function exists, and a unique rational expectations pricing function exists,
following Blanchard and Kahn (1980). These functions will include the proportions of non-rational
households and firms - and their bounded rational expectations - as arguments in the general case.
Thus we refer to models as determinate even though the expectations of a subset of the agents
are state variables. This terminology, of course, would cease to make sense if there were no agents
with rational expectations in the model.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Stability Properties of EL and IR Models. ρr > 0, λx = 1.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Stability Properties of EL and IR Models. ρr = 1, λx = 1.
5.3.2 Internal Rationality in a Heterogeneous New Keynesian Model
We now turn to the heterogeneous agent NK model with proportions nh,t and nf,t of RE households
and firms respectively, with the remaining agents internally rational.11 In our set-up (and that of
Massaro (2013)) RE agents know the full RE-IR composite model and are therefore aware of the
existence of IR agents and of the reinforcement learning process that determines the evolution of
nh,t and nf,t.
Figure 4 provides insights into the model’s dynamic behaviour by plotting the impulse response
functions for the monetary policy shock with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.04. With the fundamental
parametrization exactly the same for the RE model and the IR model, the latter produces high
frequency cycles superimposed on the business cycle frequency generated by the shock. Thus, the
internally rational NK model exhibits larger responses and greater volatility following small shocks.
11See Branch and McGough (2016) for a recent survey.
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Figure 4: RE versus IR-RE Composite Expectations with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.04; lagged
observations: Monetary Policy Shock
In this sense, the stable parametrization here produces business cycles that are more endogenous
than those generated by rational expectations NK models. These features of the model are well-
supported by the data: in a Bayesian estimation of the heterogeneous agent model, Deak et al.
(2016) show in a likelihood race that the IR component with heuristic rules provides a far better
fit than the pure RE case.
The highly nonlinear nature of the model results in a highly asymmetric and non-normal
joint distribution in the stochastic steady state. Table 1 describes the steady state distribution
for a third order solution of the internally rational NK model described in section 5.3 with the
following parameterisation: µREh = µ
IR
h = µ
RE
f = µ
IR
f = 0.7, Ch = Cf = 0, σA = σMS = 0.01;
σMPS = 0.001, where the last three parameters are the standard deviations of the technology,
mark-up, and monetary policy shocks, respectively. Aggregate consumption, hours, inflation,
and interest rates exhibit extremely high kurtosis, or fat tails, and high skewness. Although
the stochastic means of most endogenous variables are close to their deterministic steady state
values, the stochastic means of the proportions of rational and boundedly rational agents are
quite different from their deterministic steady state values. If volatility increases as a result of
more volatile exogenous shocks then the stochastic mean will shift further in favour of rationality.
Counter-intuitively, this raises the possibility that injecting more uncertainty into the economy by
raising the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock can actually be welfare improving -
although this would depend on the size of the welfare loss stemming from the cost of rationality.
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Deterministic Mean Stochastic Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Ct
C 1.0000 0.9912 0.0260 -2.037 15.56
Ht
H 1.0000 1.0036 0.0166 2.595 19.09
Wt
W 1.0000 0.9981 0.0204 0.560 1.951
Πt
Π 1.0000 1.0054 0.0169 1.644 9.904
Rn,t
Rn
1.0000 1.0054 0.0145 1.708 10.25
nh,t 0.5000 0.5795 0.1872 1.964 12.48
nf,t 0.5000 0.5195 0.0290 2.169 12.09
Table 1: Third Order Solution of NK IR-RE Model
This subsection has examined the case where monetary policy induces saddle-path stability
thus ruling out indeterminacy and local instability. But if rules are badly chosen the model will
exhibit globally bounded dynamics with chaotic dynamics as in Brock and Hommes (1997) and
Branch and McGough (2010). Whether such patterns of output and inflation are compatible with
the data is an open question.
5.4 Incorporating Disequilibrium in DSGE Models
We now turn to the remaining area highlighted earlier, concerning the criticism that DSGE models
fail to deal with disequilibrium. As Howitt (2012) puts it,
“...the macroeconomic learning literature of Sargent (1999), Evans and Honkapohja
(2001b) and others goes a long way towards understanding disequilibrium dynamics.
But understanding how the system works goes well beyond this. For in order to achieve
the kind of coordinated state that general equilibrium analysis presumes, someone has
to find the right prices for the myriad of goods and services in the economy, and
somehow buyers and sellers have to be matched in all these markets. More generally
someone has to create, maintain and operate markets, holding buffer stocks of goods
and money to accommodate other transactors’ wishes when supply and demand are not
in balance, providing credit to deficit units with good investment prospects, especially
those who are maintaining the markets that others depend on for their daily existence,
and performing all the other tasks that are needed in order for the machinery of a
modern economic system to function.”
In the most general sense, ACE scholars are concerned that DSGE models, and indeed most tempo-
rary equilibrium models, rely too heavily on simultaneous determination of prices and quantities
within any given period. Instead, ACE models tend to have explicit time orderings of events
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and unidirectional causal structure within any given period, allowing them to be interpreted as
disequilibrium models (see section 2.2 and footnote 1 above).
Given the above, the behavioural NK models surveyed here can incorporate this type of disequi-
librium, but do not usually do so. In addition, this basic critique of temporary equilibrium is often
conflated with criticisms of the more restrictive Walrasian equilibria used in early DSGE models and
real business cycle models, which tends to be replaced with search and matching, buffer stocks, and
imperfect competition in contemporary models. The incorporation of search and matching mecha-
nisms started with the contributions of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000), and
there has been significant progress in embedding Mortensen-Pissarides search-matching frictions
into otherwise standard NK models. Examples include Campolmi et al. (2010), Faia et al. (2010)
and Monacelli et al. (2010). Many models featuring MPSM frictions focus only on the extensive
margin, but there also are examples of models (for instance Thomas (2008), Krause et al. (2008)
and Cantore et al. (2014)) that model the intensive margin in addition to the unemployment rate.
Regarding output market frictions and buffer stocks of goods and services, only recently have
these been incorporated into RBC or DSGE models. Examples are Khan and Thomas (2007),
which provides a micro-founded theory of inventories that succeeds in reproducing stylized facts
regarding inventory investment in the USA, and Den Haan (2014), which combines an inventory
model with a MPSM model of labour markets. These are equilibrium models in both the Nash
sense and the sense described above, but disequilibrium models in the Walrasian sense. They also
assume rational expectations; combining the goods and labour market frictions in these models
with bounded rationality as above is a possible route for behavioural NK models to take.
5.5 Summary
This section reviewed the behavioural New Keynesian model that incorporates Brock-Hommes
complexity into the conventional New Keynesian DSGE model. Existing behavioural NK models
use a form of Euler equation learning, which essentially means that households and firms forecast
their own future decisions. Thus an internally rational NK model was discussed, following recent
work by Deak et al. (2016), which can be considered an advance on this literature. Both the
behavioural and internally rational NK models incorporate heterogeneity and bounded rationality
into the standard New Keynesian framework, and in so doing generate complex dynamics.
As discussed in section 2, the DSGE literature has gone a long way in answering the criticisms
of ACE and other scholars. However, we believe that the New Keynesian model discussed in this
survey incorporates the insights of ACE in a fruitful manner. Unfortunately, it does not incorporate
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AB Standard DSGE Internally Rational NK Model
Computational Solution Computational Solution Computational Solution
Non-optimising Agents Dynamic Optimizing Agents Dynamic Optimizing Agents
Heterogeneous Agents Representative Agent Heterogeneous Agents
Boundedly Rational Agents Rational Expectations Combination of RE and non-RE
Direct Interaction Interaction through Market Prices Interaction through Market Prices
Networks Implied Fully Connected Networks Implied Fully Connected Networks
Non-Market Clearing Market Clearing Non-Market Clearing
Disequilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
Distribution Calibration Steady State Calibration Systems Estimation
Table 2: Summary of Differences Between ACE, standard DSGE, and IR NK Models
local interaction and disequilibrium - the remaining criticisms of DSGE that we have reviewed in
this paper. Table 2 summarises the progress that has been made in bridging the gap between ACE
and DSGE with the internally rational NK model.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has considered the major points of contention between macro ACE and DSGE mod-
elling, and has reviewed a literature which attempts to synthesise, and thus bridge the gap between,
these two approaches. First, we considered the major criticisms directed at DSGE modelling by
the ACE community, and then reviewed the main families of mature macro ACE models. We then
reviewed the empirical performance of these models. We then reviewed the literature surrounding
the behavioural New Keynesian model, and provided a detailed description of the internally ra-
tional New Keynesian model. This model improves the microfoundations of the behavioural New
Keynesian model, whilst answering some of the criticisms directed at DSGE modelling in the ACE
literature.
We hope that the synthesis and review presented in this paper will be useful for macroe-
conomists who are not yet familiar with macro ACE or behavioural New Keynesian models. We
also hope that the research program outlined here will constitute a profitable direction for the
economics profession following the perceived failure of DSGE modelling in the light of the 2008
financial crisis. Two avenues immediately suggest themselves. First, local interaction, in the shape
of matching functions or replicator dynamics, could be incorporated into the internally rational NK
model. Second, a similar model could be constructed using the heterogeneous agent methodology
of Krusell and Smith (1998), which would bring the methodology closer to the microsimulation
structure of a lot of agent-based models.
29
The DSGE literature reviewed in the present paper is not, of course, the only way in which ACE
and DSGE models can be brought closer together. Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015) work from
the opposite direction by introducing forward-looking optimising agents into an ACE framework.
They use an equivalent to internal rationality which they refer to as “constructive rational decision
making”. This is a novel macro ACE model in having internally rational optimisers: households
maximise expected intertemporal utility over an infinite time-horizon and firms do the same with
their utility being taken as profit. Notably, the model is closer to a pure disequilibrium model, with
the time interval divided into 6 sub-intervals, and agents adopt optimised parameterised decision
rules proportional to expected market-clearing prices and then update these parameters through
reinforcement learning. A third line of research, therefore, would be to explore the similarities
between the internally rational NK model presented here and the Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015)
model.
Finally, a limitation that affects any macroeconomics that seeks to incorporate bounded ra-
tionality is the gap in our empirical knowledge with respect to the microfoundations of economic
behaviour. For example, Lengnick (2013) argues that identity should be considered as part of
individual decisions, and concepts such as reciprocity, fairness, and loss aversion should be incor-
porated into macroeconomic models. Yet, he notes that simple behavioural rules in ACE models
are usually either derived from survey studies or “common-sensical reasoning”. A profitable way
forward here may be a sustained effort to incorporate the results of experimental economics into
macroeconomic analysis - extending work already done with robust maxmin decision rules (Hansen
and Sargent (2008)), smooth ambiguity utility (Ilut and Schneider (2014), Ju and Miao (2012)),
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman et al. (1990), Barberis (2013) Dhami
and Al-Nowaihi (2010)), and hyperbolic discounting (Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell and Smith
(2002)). This ambitious project is more in keeping with the inter-disciplinary nature of agent-based
modelling and awaits future research.
30
References
Adam, K. and A. Marcet (2011). Internal Rationality, Imperfect Market Knowledge and Asset
Prices. Journal of Economic Theory 146 (3), 1224–1252.
Aiyagari, S. R. (1994, August). Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109 (3), 659–84.
Al-Suwailem, S. (2011). Behavioural complexity. Journal of Economic Surveys 25, 481–506.
Alvarez, F., A. Atkeson, and P. Kehoe (2002). Money, interest rates, and exchange rates with
endogenously segmented markets. Journal of Political Economy 110, 73–112.
Assenza, T., D. Delli Gatti, and J. Grazzini (2015). Emergent dynamics of a macroeconomic agent
based model with capital and credit. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 50, 5–28.
Barberis, N. C. (2013). Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (1), 173–196.
Benhabib, J. (1992). Cycles and Chaos in Economic Equilibrium. Princeton University Press.
Bianchi, C., P. Cirillo, M. Gallegati, and P. Vagliasindi (2008). Validation in agent-based models:
An investigation on the CATS model. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 67 (3-4),
947–964.
Blanchard, O. and C. Kahn (1980). The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational
Expectations. Econometrica 48, 1305–1313.
Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous preferences: the cultural consequences of markets and other eco-
nomic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1), 75 – 111.
Branch, W. A. and G. W. Evans (2011). Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Agents. Economic
Theory 47 (2), 365–393.
Branch, W. A., G. W. Evans, and B. McGough (2012). Finite Horizon Learning. CDMA Working
Paper, 12/04.
Branch, W. A. and B. McGough (2010). Dynamic predictor election in a new keynesian model
with heterogeneous agents. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (8), 1492–1508.
Branch, W. A. and B. McGough (2016). Heterogeneous Expectations and Micro-Foundations
in Macroeconomics. Forthcoming in the Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 4,
31
Heterogeneous Agent Models, edited by Cars Hommes and Blake LeBaron. This Handbook will
be published in the Elsevier Handbooks in Economics series, Edited by Kenneth Arrow, Michael
Woodford and Julio Rotemberg.
Brock, W. A. and C. H. Hommes (1997). A Rational Route to Randomness. Econometrica 65,
1059–1095.
Campolmi, A., E. Faia, and R. C. Winkler (2010). Fiscal calculus in a New Keynesian model with
matching frictions. Mimeo, University of Frankfurt.
Cantore, C., P. Levine, and G. Melina (2014). A Fiscal Stimulus and Jobless Recovery. Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics 116 (3), 669–701.
Chen, S. and S. Wang (2011). Emergent complexity in agent-based computational economics.
Journal of Economic Surveys 25, 527–546.
Cincotti, S., M. Raberto, and A. Teglio (2010). Credit money and macroeconomic instability in
the agent-based model and simulator eurace. Economics 3, 2010 – 2026.
Cogley, T. and T. J. Sargent (2008). Anticipated utility and rational expectations as approxima-
tions of bayesian decision making. International Economic Review 49 (1), 185–221.
Dawid, H., S. Gemkow, P. Harting, K. Kabus, K. Wersching, and M. Neugart (2008). Skills,
innovation, and growth: An agent-based policy analysis. Jahrbucher fur Nationalkonomie und
Statistik 228 (2-3), 251–275.
Dawid, H., S. Gemkow, P. Harting, and M. Neugart (2009). On the effects of skill upgrading in
the presence of spatial labor market frictions: An agent-based analysis of spatial policy design.
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 12 (4).
Dawid, H. and M. Neugart (2011). Agent-based models for economic policy design. Eastern
Economic Journal 37 (1), 44 – 50.
De Grauwe, P. (2011). Animal Spirits and Monetary Policy. Economic Theory 47 (2–3), 423–457.
De Grauwe, P. (2012a). Booms and Busts in Economic Activity: A Behavioral Explanation.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 83 (3), 484–501.
De Grauwe, P. (2012b). Lectures on Behavioral Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press.
De Grauwe, P. and P. R. Katwasser (2012). Animal Spirits in the Foreign Exchange Market.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36 (8), 1176–1192.
32
Deak, S., P. Levine, and B. Yang (2016). A New Keynesian Behavioural Model with Internal
Rationality and Heterogeneous Agents. School of Economics, University of Surrey. Presented at
the Money, Macro and Finance Conference, September 2016, University of Bath.
Deissenberg, C., S. van der Hoog, and H. Dawid (2008). Eurace: A massively parallel agent-based
model of the european economy. Applied Mathematics and Computation 204, 541 – 552.
Delli Gatti, D., S. Desiderio, E. Gaffeo, P. Cirilo, and M. Gallegati (2011). Macroeconomics from
the Bottom-up. Springer-Verlag Italia.
Delli Gatti, D., C. Di Guilmi, E. Gaffeo, G. Giulioni, M. Gallegati, and A. Palestrini (2005). A new
approach to business fluctuations: heterogeneous interacting agents, scaling laws and financial
fragility. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 56 (4), 489 – 512.
Delli Gatti, D., E. Gaffeo, and M. Gallegati (2010). Complex agent-based macroeconomics: a
manifesto for a new paradigm. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 5 (2), 111 –
135.
Delli Gatti, D., E. Gaffeo, M. Gallegati, G. Giulioni, A. Kirman, A. Palestrini, and A. Russo
(2007). Complex dynamics and empirical evidence. Information Sciences 177 (5), 1204 – 1221.
Delli Gatti, D., M. Gallegati, G. Giulioni, and A. Palestrini (2003). Financial fragility, patterns
of firms entry and exit and aggregate dynamics. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion 51, 79–97.
Delli Gatti, D., M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, R. A., and S. J.E. (2009). Business fluctuations and
bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving network economy. Journal of Economic Interaction and
Coordination 4 (2), 195212.
Delli Gatti, D., M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, R. A., and S. J.E. (2010). The financial accelerator
in an evolving credit network. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (9), 1627–1650.
Den Haan, W. (2014). Inventories and the Role of Goods-Market Frictions for Business Cycles.
Discussion Papers 1402, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
Dhami, S. and A. Al-Nowaihi (2010). Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Tax Evasion: Expected
Utility versus Prospect Theory. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 75 (2), 313 –
337.
Dilaver, O., R. Jump, and P. Levine (2016). Agent-based macroeconomics and dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models: Where do we go from here? School of Economics Discussion Papers
0116, University of Surrey.
33
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, M. Napoletano, and A. Roventini (2013). Income distribution, credit and fiscal
policies in an agent-based keynesian model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (8),
1598 –1625.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini (2005). Animal spirits, lumpy investment and endogenous
business cycles. LEM Working Paper Series 2005/04.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini (2006). An evolutionary model of endogenous business
cycles. Computational Economics 27 (1), 3–34.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini (2008). The microfoundations of business cycles: An
evolutionary, multi-agent model. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 18, 413–432.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini (2010). Schumpeter meeting keynes: A policy-friendly model
of endogenous growth and business cycle. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (9),
1748 – 1767.
Duffy, J. and M. Unver (2006). Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders.
Economic Theory 27, 537–563.
Eusepi, S. and B. Preston (2011). Expectations, learning, and business cycle fluctuations. American
Economic Review 101 (6), 2844–2872.
Eusepi, S. and B. Preston (2016). The science of monetary policy: An imperfect knowledge
perspective. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 782.
Evans, G. W. and S. Honkapohja (2001a). Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Princeton
University Press.
Evans, G. W. and S. Honkapohja (2001b). Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Prince-
ton University Press.
Fagiolo, G. and A. Roventini (2016). Macroeconomic Policy in DSGE and Agent-Based Models
Redux: New Developments and Challenges Ahead. Laboratory of Economics and Management
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Working Paper Series.
Faia, E., W. Lechthaler, and C. Merkl (2010). Fiscal multipliers and the labour market in the open
economy. Kiel Working Papers 1592.
Foley, D. (2005). Complex and chaotic dynamics in economics. In M. Lines (Ed.), Nonlinear
dynamical systems in economics. New York: SpringerWienNewYork.
34
Gabaix, X. (2011). The granular origins of aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica 79 (3), 733–772.
Gaffeo, E., M. Catalano, F. Clementi, D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, and A. Russo (2007). Reflections
on modern macroeconomics: Can we travel along a safer road. Physica A 382 (1), 89–97.
Gaffeo, E., M. Catalano, D. Delli Gatti, S. Desiderio, and M. Gallegati (2008). Adaptive micro-
foundations for emergent macroeconomics. Eastern Economic Journal 34, 441–463.
Gali, J. (2008). Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle. Princeton University Press.
Gali, J., J. Lopez-Salido, and J. Valles (2007). Understanding the effects of government spending
multipliers. Journal of the European Economic Association 5, 227–270.
Geanakoplos, J., R. Axtell, D. J. Farmer, P. Howitt, B. Conlee, J. Goldstein, M. Hendrey,
N. Palmer, and C. Yang (2012). Getting at systemic risk via an agent-based model of the
housing market. The American Economic Review 102, 53–58.
Goodwin, R. (1967). A growth cycle. In C. Feinstein (Ed.), Social, Capitalism and Economic
Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Graham, L. (2011). Individual Rationality, Model-Consistent Expectations and Learning. Mimeo,
University College London.
Grazzini, J. and M. Richiardi (2015). Estimation of Ergodic Agent-Based Models by Simulated
Minimum Distance. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 51, 148–165.
Hansen, L. and T. J. Sargent (2008). Robustness. Princeton University Press.
Harris, C. and D. Laibson (2001). Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers. Econometrica 69 (4),
935–957.
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. L. Violante (2009). Quantitative Macroeconomics with
Heterogeneous Households. NBER W.P. no. 1468.
Hommes, C. (2011). The heterogeneous expectations hypothesis: Some evidence from the lab.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35, 1–24.
Hommes, C. (2013). Behavioral Rationality and Heterogeneous Expectations in Complex Economic
Systems. CUP.
Hommes, C. and M. Zhu (2014). Behavioral Learning Equilibria. Journal of Economic The-
ory 150(C), 778–814.
35
Horst, U. (2005). Financial price fluctuations in a stock market model with many interacting
agents. Economic Theory 25, 917–932.
Howitt, P. (2012). What have central bankers learned from modern macroeconomic theory? Jour-
nal of Macroeconomics 34 (1), 11–22.
Ilut, C. L. and M. Schneider (2014). Ambiguous Business Cycles. American Economic Re-
view 104 (8), 2368–99.
Jang, T.-S. and S. Sacht (2012). Identification of Animal Spirits in a Bounded Rationality Model:
An Application to the Euro Area. Economics Working Papers 2012-02, Christian-Albrechts-
University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
Jang, T.-S. and S. Sacht (2014). Animal spirits and the business cycle: Empirical evidence from
moment matching. Economics Working Papers 2014-06, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel,
Department of Economics.
Ju, M. and J. Miao (2012). Ambiguity, Learning and Asset Returns. Econometrica 80 (2), 559–591.
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98 (2), 1325 – 1348.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.
Econometrica 47 (2), 263 91.
Khan, A. and J. K. Thomas (2007). Inventories and the business cycle: An equilibrium analysis
of (s, s) policies. American Economic Review 97 (4), 1165–1188.
Krause, M., D. Lopez-Salido, and T. Lubik (2008). Inflation dynamics with search frictions: A
structural econometric analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (5), 892–916.
Kreps, D. (1998). Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice. In D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien
(Eds.), Frontiers aof Research in Economic Theory, pp. 242–274. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Krusell, P. and A. Smith (2002). Consumption-Savings Decisions with Quasi-Geometric Discount-
ing. Econometrica 71, 365 – 375.
Krusell, P. and A. A. Smith, Jr. (1998, October). Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroe-
conomy. Journal of Political Economy 106 (5), 867–896.
36
Kukacka, J. and J. Barunik (2016). Estimation of financial agent-based models with simulated
maximum likelihood. IES Working Paper, IES FSV, Charles University in Prague 7/2016.
Landini, S., M. Gallegati, and J. Stiglitz (2015). Economies with heterogeneous interacting learning
agents. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 10 (1), 91–118.
Lengnick, M. (2013). Agent-based macroeconomics: A baseline model. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 86, 102–120.
Lux, T. and M. Marchesi (1999). Scaling and criticality in a stochastic multi-agent model of a
financial market. Nature 397, 498–500.
Massaro, D. (2013). Heterogeneous Expectations in Monetary DSGE Models. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 37 (3), 680–692.
Monacelli, T., R. Perotti, and A. Trigari (2010). Unemployment fiscal multipliers. Journal of
Monetary Economics 57 (5), 531–553.
Mortensen, D. T. and C. A. Pissarides (1994). Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory
of Unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 208, 397–415.
Mosini, V. (2007). Equilibrium in economics: Scope and limits. Routledge.
Nelson, R. and S. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Nimark, K. P. (2014). Man-Bites-Dog Business Cycles. American Economic Review 104 (8), 2320–
67.
Pissarides, C. A. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory . MIT Press.
Raberto, M., A. Teglio, and S. Cincotti (2012). Debt deleveraging and business cycles: An agent-
based perspective. Economics 6 (201227).
Recchioni, M., G. Tedeschi, and M. Gallegati (2015). A calibration procedure for analyzing stock
price dynamics in an agent-based framework. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 60,
1–25.
Ricetti, L., A. Russo, and M. Gallegati (2013). Unemployment benefits and financial leverage in
an agent based macroeconomic model. Economics 2013-42.
Ruge-Murcia, F. (2012). Estimating nonlinear dsge models by the simulated method of moments:
With an application to business cycles. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36, 914–938.
37
Russo, A., M. Catalano, E. Gaffeo, M. Gallegati, and M. Napoletano (2007). Industrial dynamics,
fiscal policy and r&d: Evidence from a computational experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 64, 426–447.
Sargent, T. J. (1999). Conquest of American Inflation. Princeton University Press.
Sinitskaya, E. and L. Tesfatsion (2015). Macroeconomics as Constructively Rational Games. Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control 61, 152–182.
Tedeschi, G., A. Mazloumian, M. Gallegati, and D. Helbing (2012). Bankruptcy cascades in
interbank markets. PloS one 7.
Teglio, A., M. Raberto, and S. Cincotti (2012). The impact of banks’ capital adequacy regulation on
the economic system: An agent-based approach. Advances in Complex Systems 15 (Supplement
2).
Thomas, C. (2008). Search and Matching Frictions and Optimal Policy. Journal of Monetary
Econsomic 55 (5), 936–956.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices. Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton
University Press.
Woodford, M. (2013). Macroeconomic analysis ithout the rational expectations hypothesis. Annual
Review of Economics 5, 303–346.
Young, H. P. (2004). Strategic Learning and its Limits. Oxfor University Press, New York.
A Response to Referees
Referee 1
1. The only remaining comment I have is with regard to the explanation of the analysis of
the new section 5.3.1. It is unclear what the exercise intends to show. What are the criteria
for determinacy and stability that are being used here? For determinacy, are the figures showing
when the RE beliefs are saddle-path stable in all cases? Or are you expanding the definition of
determinacy to refer to something about a multiplicity of steady-states in the case of different types
of beliefs? Because with the inclusion of any kind of adaptively formed beliefs, the notion of unique
paths to steady that determinacy usually implies under rational expectations doesn’t really make
sense. It always depends on initial beliefs or initial conditions in the case where λx = 1 as done
38
here. With learning, beliefs are state variables. I think you likely mean that the RE beliefs still
satisfy the standard determinacy conditions for a solution surrounding a unique steady state that
takes into account the adaptive learning beliefs when λx = 1. Whether or not that outcome is stable
under learning is not being addressed. But it isn’t clear exactly what you want readers to take away
from this section. Clarification here would be helpful to readers.
We have now added an extra paragraph to the end of the section you refer to, which we agree was
somewhat brief. As it explains, we use determinacy in the standard way described in Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) - i.e. in the state space form there should be the same number of eigenvalues
greater than one in modulus as forward looking variables and the same number of eigenvalues
smaller than one in modulus as predetermined variables. This ensures that, in our model, the
expectations terms in the state space RE consumption and pricing functions will converge and
ensure unique reduced form RE consumption and pricing functions. The state space form will
then be saddle path stable, and the reduced form will be locally stable. Indeed, as you point out,
the RE consumption and pricing functions will have to take into account both the proportions and
beliefs of non-RE households and firms, inasmuch as these (pre-determined) variables help predict
aggregate output, wages, prices, etc.
Note, however, that this is the case even when λx 6= 1 - all λx governs is the speed at which
non-RE households and firms update their expectations. Finally, we have noted in the added
paragraph that all of the above is completely irrelevant when there are no RE households or firms,
because in this case there are no forward looking variables in the state space form so determinacy
(or the lack thereof) is not an issue.
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